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Greenfield vs. Acquisition:
The Strategy of Japanese Investors in the United States
Abstract
Multinational firms can enter a foreign market by taking over existing local
firms (acquisitions) or by setting up new ventures (greenfield investments).
Surprisingly, there has been limited empirical work on this topic. This paper
examines the determinants of this choice by looking at Japanese entries into
the United States. By focusing on firms of one country entering a single
market, we are able to separate the impact of a firm's strategy from that of
the characteristics of the target industry or country.
The paper tests simultaneously a number of competing hypotheses. The results
suggest that acquisitions are used by Japanese investors with weak competitive
advantages, while investors with strong advantages find that greenfield
investments are a more efficient way to transfer these advantages to the U.S.
Acquisitions are also chosen to enter industries with either very high or very
low growth rates, when entry is at a scale that is large relative to the
parent, and when entry is into a different industry. The Japanese investor's
previous experience of the U.S. market, its financial situation, and its
status as a follower in an oligopolistic industry have no statistically




A firm which expands into foreign markets must choose between keeping or
sharing control of its subsidiaries. It must also decide whether to acquire
an existing local firm (make an acquisition) or to build a new plant (make a
greenfield investment). While some recent empirical research (Gatignon and
Anderson 1988; Gomes-Casseres 1989, 1990; Sanna-Randaccio 1990; Hennart 1991a)
has investigated the choice between full and partial control of subsidiaries,
there have been very few large-sample, multivariate studies of the
determinants of the choice between greenfield entry and acquisitions (Caves
and Mehra 1986; Kogut and Singh 1988; Zejan 1990). The topic has been
similarly neglected in the domestic context, with Yip (1982) being, to the
best of our knowledge, the only empirical study of the determinants of
domestic expansion through internal growth or acquisitions.
This study is the first to explore the factors which cause Japanese
investors to enter the U.S. through acquisitions rather than through
greenfield investments. A significant contribution of the paper is the focus
on entries by firms of a single country (Japan) into a single market (the
U.S.). Previous empirical studies have either focused on entries in the
United States by firms based in a large number of foreign countries (Caves and
Mehra 1986; Kogut and Singh 1988) or on firms based in a single country (the
U.S. for Dubin 1976; Sweden for Zejan 1990) entering a large number of foreign
countries. Studying entry by firms based in different countries makes it
difficult to model parent strategies, as collecting comparable data on firms
registered in many different countries is next to impossible due to
international differences in accounting rules and reporting requirements. The
tendency is then to model parent strategies with data on the industry of the
investor or that of the U.S. sector entered, making it difficult to separate
the impact of parent strategies from that of the target U.S. industry. While
this problem does not arise when one looks at foreign entries by U.S.
investors, the influence of parent characteristics becomes tricky to separate
from that of host country regulations and investment climates.
By concentrating on Japanese investors in the U.S., we can describe
parent strategies through a rich array of firm-level data while also taking
into consideration the characteristics of the U.S. industries penetrated by
Japanese investors, thus bringing out more clearly the impact of a firm's
strategy on the method it chooses to enter foreign markets.
The next section reviews the main theoretical approaches to the choice
between greenfield entry and acquisition and identifies the principal
variables. Section 3 describes the methodology and the elaboration of the
variables. Section 4 reports the results, while Section 5 presents our
conclusions.
2 . The Choice between Greenfield Entry and Acquisition
There is no well developed theory of the determinants of the choice
between domestic expansion through internal growth or acquisitions, and this
is also true of the choice between greenfield investment and acquisitions as
alternative ways of entering foreign markets. Four bodies of theory have,
however, addressed issues that are relevant for an understanding of this
choice: (1) Transaction cost theory, which explains why firms invest in
foreign countries, can be extended to show how the type of advantages
exploited by the investor affects the mode of entry; (2) the theory of mergers
and acquisitions, although it has been mostly interested in explaining why
acquisitions take place, has also explored why acquisitions are preferred to
mergers; 2 (3) Edith Penrose (1959), in her theory of the growth of the firm,
has discussed the choice between growth by acquisition and growth by internal
expansion; (4) lastly, Chatterjee (1990) has discussed how capital market
imperfections may affect the relative cost of these two modes of entry.
2.1. Transaction Cost Theory
For the transaction cost theory of foreign direct investment (FDI) the
essence of FDI is the cross-border expansion of firms. Two conditions must be
met for this expansion to take places (1) locating facilities abroad must be
more efficient than exporting to foreign markets from a domestic location; (2)
a firm must find it desirable to own the foreign facilities, i.e. to organize
its interdependence with foreigners through hierarchical rather than through
market methods. The major reason why firms find it advantageous to organize
their cross border interactions through hierarchy is that the costs of
organizing interdependences in markets are higher than those of organizing
them within multinational firms (Hennart 1982).
There is now an abundant literature which discusses the types of
interdependences that are likely to be more efficiently organized within
multinational firms than through international markets, and which therefore
lead to FDI (see Hennart, 1991b for a recent survey). FDI takes place when
firms internalize markets for certain intermediate inputs, such as raw
materials, parts and equipment, loanable funds, knowledge and goodwill. For
example, a firm which wants to exploit abroad its firm-specific knowledge will
choose to transfer this knowledge internally rather than license it to foreign
producers if the market for this knowledge is subject to high transaction
costs.
While there has been much research on why firms invest abroad, much less
attention has been focused on the implication of the theory on the choice
between greenfield entry and acquisition. Yet it is possible to extend the
theory to show how a foreign investor's choice of mode of entry will depend on
the nature of the firm-specific advantages that it brings or seeks to obtain
in the target market.
A firm investing abroad combines some firm-specific advantages developed
at home, and which can be exploited abroad at low marginal cost, with other
assets available in the foreign country. The level and nature of the firm-
specific advantages the investor is exploiting abroad determines whether entry
will be through greenfield or acquisition. 3 Firm-specific advantages may be of
two types: they may consist in superior organizational ability or technical
expertise that can be separated from the organization, or they may be deeply
embedded into the firm's labor force. In the first case, an entrant can
combine these advantages with those embodied in an acquired foreign firm. In
the second case, advantages will be so tightly bound to the foreign investor's
organization that they cannot be combined with an acquired unit and must
instead be exploited by recreating on foreign soil a clone of the foreign
parent
.
The latter case characterizes the firm-specific advantages that support
the entry of some of the more technologically advanced Japanese investors.
Dunning' s (1986) study of Japanese investment in the United Kingdom identifies
superior quality as one of the major competitive advantage that R&D intensive
Japanese investors have over their British competitors. That high quality is
achieved through sophisticated labor management practices, such as work teams,
or careful selection and training of the labor force (Pucik and Hatvany 1983;
Aoki 1988; Florida and Kenney 1991). Greenfield entry is the most efficient
way to transfer these advantages to foreign countries because it makes it
possible to install the firm's managerial practices from the outset. A firm
making a greenfield investment is able to mold the affiliate by choosing its
location and hiring its labor force, while one making an acquisition inherits
the acquired firm's labor force and company culture (Jemison and Sitkin 1986).
Hence research and development intensive Japanese parents should show a
preference for greenfield entry.
Yoshida's interviews of the managers of 15 R&D intensive Japanese
subsidiaries in the U.S. confirms this view. The managers he interviewed
pointed out that they preferred greenfield entry because "they could transfer
or devise their own management systems with freshly hired U.S. employees" and
that greenfield entry "offered less risk, in terms of organizational control,
than acquisitions" (Yoshida, 1987, pp. 61-62 ). 4 Kujawa (1984) also reports
that Japanese investors in the U.S. showed a marked preference for greenfields
over acquisitions "because of the desire to build a company-specific workforce
management system." This suggests that
HI: Everything else constant, the greater the Japanese investor's research and
development intensity, the higher the probability it will enter through a
greenfield investment.
Inversely, acquisitions will be chosen if Japanese investors require
complementary inputs which can be more cheaply acquired bundled in a qoing
concern than in disembodied form on the market. Such is the case when the
Japanese parent does not know how to run a subsidiary. By making an
acquisition the Japanese investor is buying a cadre of local managers who know
how to operate in the local economy, and who possess valuable information. We
may think of that information as consisting of two components. One component
is a general knowledge of the local economy. How to operate in the U.S.
market is learned as a by-product of doing business there. This knowledge is
tacit, and hence its purchase in disembodied form is subject to high
transaction costs (Hennart 1982; 1988). One may therefore expect Japanese
entrants with little experience of the U.S. environment to prefer acquisitions
(Wilson 1980; Caves 1982). By contrast parents that have made previous
investments in the U.S. have presumably accumulated the required knowledge in-
house, and do not need to acquire local firms. Hence
H2. Everything else constant, the lesser the Japanese investors' experience of
the U.S. market, the greater the likelihood they will enter through
acquisitions.
The second type of knowledge held by the management of the acquired unit
can be called "product-specific" knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of a particular
industry. We would expect a Japanese investor entering the U.S. to
manufacture a product which it does not produce in Japan to opt for an
acquisition to obtain product-specific knowledge. Again such knowledge is
difficult to obtain on the market in disembodied form.
H3. Everything else constant, an entry which represents a diversification for
a Japanese investor is more likely to be carried out through an acquisition
than through a greenfield investment.
Similarly, some of the investor's firm-specific advantages can be
successfully combined with going concerns, and therefore leveraged through
foreign acquisitions. One can think of two such cases. First, the main
advantage of diversified firms may consist in sophisticated management control
systems. This advantage is embedded in senior managers, and thus generally
compatible with quasi-independent subsidiaries managed by local personnel.
Its exploitation can therefore be achieved through foreign acquisitions (Caves
and Mehra 1986). Dubin (1976), Wilson (1980), Yip (1982), Caves and Mehra
(1986), and Zejan (1990) found a correlation between a parent's overall
product diversification and its preference for acquisition.
H4: Everything else constant, diversified Japanese investors can be expected
to show a higher propensity to enter through acquisitions.
Another firm-specific advantage which the foreign investor can usually
successfully combine with a foreign acquisition is marketing knowledge. A
domestic example is Philip Morris' entry into the beer industry through its
purchase of Miller Brewing. Philip Morris firm-specific advantage were its
marketing skills, and these skills could be profitably combined with an
existing beer brand (Yip, 1982). Similarly, acquisitions make it possible for
foreign entrants to acquire local brand names and to combine them with their
firm-specific marketinq skills. Hence acquisition is likely to be the chosen
mode of entry by advertising intensive Japanese firms, especially if they are
entering mature industries where established brand names are an asset, and if
differences in language and culture reduce the benefits of using their
Japanese brand names in the U.S. If this is the case, and if media
advertising expenditures in Japan are a good proxy for marketing skills, then
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we would expect advertising intensive Japanese investors to choose
acquisitions. Hence
H5: Everything else constant, the greater the Japanese investor's advertising
intensity, the higher the probability it will enter through an acquisition.
2.2 Mergers and acquisitions theory
Oster (1990) points out that there are two reasons why a firm would
choose to expand through acquisitions rather than through greenfield
investment. One reason may be that the target firm represents a "bargain" for
the acquirer, i.e. that the value of the assets acquired is lower than their
replacement cost. Another possibility is that the investor can leverage its
firm-specific advantages more effectively through an acquisition than through
a greenfield entry.
One key difference between entry through greenfield and entry through
acquisition is that the complementary inputs needed for entry are purchased in
different markets, in the market for inputs (land, machinery) for greenfield
entry, in that for companies in the case of acquisitions. Hence the choice
between these two entry modes hinges on the relative cost of buying
complementary inputs in these two markets. Acquisitions will be preferred if
"bargains" can be obtained in the market for firms, and any factor that
depresses the price of stocks should make acquisitions more attractive
relative to greenfield entry. The relative price of stocks to a foreign
investor depends on the value of the dollar and the extent to which U.S.
stocks are over-or-undervalued (Khoury 1980). 5 In our case,
H6. Everything else constant, the stronger the value of the yen relative to
the dollar, and the lower U.S. relative to Japanese stock market prices, the
higher the attractiveness of entry through acquisition relative to greenfield.
Whether such bargains do exist in practice hinges on the efficiency of capital
markets.
The second reason why acquisitions may be preferred to greenfields is
that this mode of entry provides benefits which cannot be obtained through
greenfield entry. This is likely to happen in the following three cases.
First, acquisitions may confer special advantages if they provide the entrant
with market power. By acquiring a rival, a foreign entrant may reduce
competition. This benefit cannot be obtained through greenfield entry, since
such an entry mode creates a new competitor. This tendency of foreign
investors to use acquisitions to enter concentrated industries is countered by
the U.S. Department of Justice, which is empowered to ban any acquisition
which would significantly increase market power. Hence whether concentration
favors acquisitions or not is an empirical question.
Another case where acquisitions may confer special advantages not
available through greenfield entry is when speedy entry is desired. Building
a subsidiary from scratch takes more time than buying a going concern
(Biggadike 1979; Caves 1982). A foreign firm may therefore choose an
acquisition if the opportunity cost of delaying entry is high. One can think
of two instances when this will be the case. First, when the target market is
growing rapidly the opportunity cost of greenfield entry will be high.
H7 : Everything else constant, the higher the rate of growth of demand in the
target market, the greater the investor's incentive to enter through
acquisition.
Second, late entrants ( "followers" ) in oligopolistic industries may
choose acquisitions over greenfields in order to speed up their response to
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the competitive threat posed by the entry of "leaders" in foreign markets
(Knickerbocker 1973; Dubin 1976; Wilson 1980, Davidson 1982, Caves and Mehra
1986; Yu and Ito 1988).
H8: Everything else constant, the probability of entry through acquisition is
greater if the Japanese investor is not the first firm in its industry to
invest in the U.S.
Lastly, entry through acquisition has clear advantages over entry through
greenfield when capacity expansion is undesirable. The greater economies of
scale, the more greenfield entry will expand capacity, and the greater the
fall in prices. Acquisitions do not add to capacity, and hence should be the
preferred entry mode in industries characterized by high scale economies and
high concentration (Yip 1982).
H9: Everything else constant, the higher the concentration ratio of the target
industry, the greater the likelihood of entry through acquisition.
The mergers and acquisition literature also discusses two problems which
are inherent with acquisitions, the inspection and interaction problems
(Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987). The inspection problem arises from the fact
that the seller of a firm has typically better information than the buyer.
Hence a substantial proportion of firms on the market will be "lemons"
( Ackerlof 1970). It is not clear why the market for firms is necessarily more
imperfect in that regard than the market for inputs, and hence the presence of
information asymmetry between Japanese buyers and U.S. sellers may not bias
the choice between greenfield and acquisition.
The interaction problem refers to the problem of integrating the new unit
into the acquirer's business. Acquisitions differ from greenfield in that
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regard, because they are much more difficult to manage than greenfield plants.
As discussed earlier, an acquired unit will have its own "company culture"
which may be difficult to meld with that of the acquirer. The less
experienced the Japanese parent is with operating in the U.S., the more it may
fear post-acquisition management problems.
H10: Everything else constant, the greater the Japanese investor's experience
of the U.S. market, the greater its propensity to enter through acquisition.
Everything else constant, differences in company cultures should also be
greater when the two firms belong to different industries. Hence,
Hll: Everything else constant, the extent of post-acquisition interaction
problems will be higher, and hence the probability of entry through
acquisition lower, if entry represents a diversification for the investor.
2.3. Theory of the growth of the firm
A parent's human resources endowment may also affect its mode of
expansion. If, as Penrose (1959) assumes, there is a maximum rate at which a
firm can recruit and train managers, then a firm which is short of personnel
is likely to be constrained in its ability to make greenfield investments and
may prefer to expand through acquisitions, since acquired units come with
their cadre of managers. Managerial constraints on greenfield expansion
should be especially tight when the size of the investment is large relative
to that of the parent.
H12: Everything else constant, the lower the investor's endowment in human
resources, the more likely it will enter through acquisition.
H13 : Everything else constant, the higher the size of the subsidiary relative
to that of the investor, the greater the probability of an entry through
acquisition.
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2.4. Capital Market Imperfections
Chatterjee (1990) argues that while the valuation that managers put on
their own investment projects is generally higher than that put by capital
markets, that difference is likely to be greater for greenfield investments
than for acquisitions, if only because the market for corporate control
provides information on the value of acquisitions, while there is much less
information available to stockholders when firms build new plants. Hence it
is usually more costly—in terms of its negative impact on the stock price—to
use financial resources which require public valuation (i.e junk bonds and
equity capital) for greenfield investments than for acquisitions. Greenfield
investment will therefore be cheaper to finance through debt or retained
earnings. Firms which are highly leveraged may thus find it expensive to
enter through greenfield, and may prefer to make acquisitions.
H14; Everything else constant, the more leveraged the foreign investor, the
more it will enter through acquisitions.
Table 2 summarizes the various hypotheses that can be derived from the
four main theoretical strands. By and large, the theories are complementary,
with two exceptions: transaction cost theory predicts that Japanese parents
with greater experience of the U.S. market will, ceteris paribus, choose
greenfield entry, while, according to merger and acquisition theory,
experienced Japanese investors will see themselves more able to handle post-
acquisition management problems, and hence are more likely to choose
acquisitions. Similarly, transaction cost theory predicts that investors
which diversify will seek acquisitions, while merger and acquisition theorists
argue that they will opt for greenfield entry so as to minimize interaction
problems.
13
Note also that the impact of the concentration ratio of the target U.S.
industry is unclear. Japanese investors may seek to increase their monopoly
power and to minimize increases in capacity by entering concentrated U.S.
industries through acquisitions. On the other hand, Japanese acquisitions in
concentrated industries may be discouraged by public opinion and antitrust
authorities.
3. Methods
Methodology and Dependent Variable
The data used in this study is taken from two separate censuses of
Japanese subsidiaries in the United States, one undertaken periodically by
Toyo Keizai (1987) and the other by the Japan Economic Institute (1981-1989).
Information on the status of a subsidiary at entry (including whether it was
acquired or established as a greenfield) is available for the years 1978 to
1980 and 1984 to 1987. An acquisition takes place when one or more Japanese
parent acquires an existing U.S. company, and a greenfield investment when one
or more Japanese parent builds a new plant. Only manufacturing subsidiaries
in which a Japanese parent's stake was at least five percent were retained.
The Japan Economic Institute and Toyo Keizai lists 558 such affiliates, of
which 203 (36.4%) are acquisitions, and 355 (63.6%) are greenfield investments
(Table 1). The proportion of acquisitions is significantly lower than that
for other direct investors in the U.S. 7 Lack of parent data reduced our sample
size to 270 observations, of which 114 (42.2%) are acquisitions. As shown in
Table 1, our sample is representative of the population of affiliates,
although with a slight over-representation of acquisitions and of subsidiaries
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in the electrical machinery industry.
Mode of entry is captured by a dummy variable which takes a value of one
if the Japanese parent made an acquisition and zero if it established a
greenfield plant. Because of the nature of the dependent variable, a binomial
logistic model is used in which the probability of acquisition is explained by
the variables described below. The regression coefficients estimate the
impact of the independent variables on the probability that the entry will be
an acquisition. A positive sign for the coefficient means that the variable
increases the probability of acquisition. The model can be expressed as
P(yk = 1) = 1/(1 + exp(-a - X^A) )
,
where yi is the dependent variable, Xt is the vector of independent variables
for the ith observation, a is the intercept parameter, and B is the vector of
regression parameters (Hastings 1986).
Independent Variables
The Japanese parent's technological intensity is measured by its research
and development expenditures as a percentage of its domestic sales (RND) for
the year preceding entry, as listed in the Japanese parent's report to Japan's
Ministry of Finance ( Yukashoken Hokokusho ) . When data was not available from
this source, we used the Japan Company Handbook . According to HI, high parent
R&D intensity should be associated with a preference for greenfield
investment
.
A parent's experience of the U.S. market at the time entry was made (EXP)
is measured by the number of years between a given entry and the establishment
of the parent's first U.S. manufacturing subsidiary. Assuming that the
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parent's level of experience of the U.S. market is proportional to the number
of years it has operated in the U.S., the greater EXP, the lower its need to
acquire a U.S. firm to obtain knowledge of the U.S. market, and the greater
the likelihood that entry will be through greenfield (H2). On the other hand,
more experienced Japanese investors may feel better able to take up the
challenge of managing a U.S. acquisition (H10). The net effect of EXP is
therefore ambiguous.
The commonality of product between parent and subsidiary (COMMON) is
measured by a dummy variable equal to one if any one of the products produced
by the affiliate matched those produced by the parent, and to zero otherwise.
According to transaction cost theory, parents who diversify are likely to
prefer acquisition to obtain industry specific knowledge (H3). On the other
hand, merger and acquisition theory suggests that they will opt for greenfield
entry (Hll). Hence we make no prediction for the sign of COMMON.
The degree of product diversification (DIV) of the Japanese parent is
measured by a Herfindahl-Hirschman type index. We used the sales breakdown of
the Japanese parent the year before entry as published in the Japan Company
Handbook . In some cases the total of the shares of identifiable products is
not equal to 1 as some product sales are lumped into an "others" category.
The formula proposed by Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1986) was used to handle
this problem:
DIV = 1 -
S ( mLi )
2
2
( s mij )
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where mii is the amount of sales of parent i to product category j . The
higher DIV, the more likely entry will be through acguisition (H4).
adv is the ratio of media advertising expenditures to sales of the
Japanese parent as listed in the company's Yukashoken Hokokusho . When
advertising expenditure data was not available from this source, we turned to
Toyo Keizai (1991). The greater the Japanese investor's advertising
intensity, the higher the probability entry will take place through
acquisition (H5).
We calculated each year's "Relative Value Index" (RVI) to capture the
availability of "bargains" in the market for acquisitions (H6). RVI is
calculated from data in OECD (1989) using Khoury's (1980) formula:
change in dollar value of Yen
rvi = ,_____.
U.S. stock price index / Japanese stock price index
The RVI is high when acquisitions of U.S. firms are relatively cheap for
Japanese investors, i.e. when the dollar is weakening and U.S. stock prices
are relatively low. An entry made in a year where the RVI is high is more
likely to be an acquisition, hence the sign of RVI should be positive (H6)
.
The impact of the growth rate of the target U.S. industry on the entry
mode is complex. Both very high and very low shipments growth encourage
acquisition, the former because the opportunity cost of greenfield entry is
larger when the target industry is growing fast than when it is growing more
slowly, the latter because bringing new capacity on line depresses profits in
slow growing markets. Following Caves and Mehra (1986) we calculated
GROWTHDEV to describe the conditions that encourage acquisitions. GROWTHDEV
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is the absolute value of GROWTH'S deviation from its sample mean divided by
its standard deviation, with GROWTH equal to the average annual growth rate of
shipments of the four-digit U.S. industry in the 5-year s before entry (U.S.
Department of Commerce, U.S. Industrial Outlook ) . Average industry growth
rate was used for the few observations with multiple SICs. GROWTHDEV is high
when the growth rate of the target U.S. industry is either very fast or very
slow. A high value of GROWTHDEV should encourage acquisitions.
A dummy variable (FOLLOW) was used to model the incentives that followers
have to enter through acquisitions (H8) . We first identified the Japanese
parent who was the first to enter any given four-digit SIC U.S. industry. We
called that parent a "leader", and all the subsequent entrants "followers".
Oligopolistic reaction theory (Knickerbocker 1973) posits that patterns of
"follow the leader" will arise in conditions of "loose oligopoly".
Consequently FOLLOW takes a value of 1 if the Japanese investor is a follower
and if its U.S. subsidiary is active in an industry characterized by "loose
oligopoly", and zero otherwise. According to Seno (1983), loose oligopoly
occurs in Japan when the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is between 1000 and 1800
or the 3-firm concentration ratio is between 50 and 70 percent. Data on
Japanese concentration ratios was obtained from Seno (1983) and Japan Economic
Institute (1984). FOLLOW should take a positive sign.
Concentration (CON) is measured by the Herf indahl-Hirschman index for the
50 largest companies for each four-digit SIC U.S. industry (1982), as
published in the 1982 Census of Manufactures . The arithmetic average of the
concentration ratio was used for subsidiaries active in multiple SICs. Entry
through acquisition should be favored in concentrated markets because it does
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not increase capacity (H9), but it should be discouraged by the Federal Trade
Commission because it is susceptible to decrease competition. Consequently,
we do not make any prediction as to the sign of this variable.
The existence of Penrose constraints on growth through internal
development is proxied by two variables, the ratio of the Japanese investor's
average annual rate of growth of domestic employment over its rate of growth
of domestic sales, both over the 5 year period preceding entry (PSALG), and
the relative size of the subsidiary (RELSZ). When employment grows faster
than sales and PSALG is high, the firm has excess labor personnel resources,
and does not need to obtain them through acquisitions (H12). Hence the sign
of PSALG should be negative. The relative size of the subsidiary (RELSZ) is
the ratio of the employment of the subsidiary over that of the parent. H13
implies that this variable should take a positive sign.
Following Palepu (1986) and Chatterjee (1990), we measure a firm's
financial leverage (LEV) by the ratio of its long term debt to its market
value, as reported in its Yukashoken Hokokusho . High leverage should
encourage acquisitions (H14).
On a priori grounds, one would expect the degree of ownership taken in a
subsidiary to be independent of the mode of entry (greenfield or acquisition).
The degree of ownership depends on the parent's need for control (Gatignon
and Anderson 1988; Gomes-Casseres 1989; Hennart 1991a), and that desired level
of ownership can be attained in either a greenfield investment or an
acquisition. Stopford and Wells (1972), however, found that joint venture
status was weakly associated with acquisitions. They did not, however, test
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this relationship while controlling for other variables. We control therefore
for the parent's level of ownership in the subsidiary, expecting this variable
to be insignificant. Joint venture status is captured by a dummy variable
(JV) which takes a value of zero if the parent owned 95% or more of the
subsidiary's equity, and one if it owned more than 5% but less than 95%. The
95% cutoff point has been used in previous studies on ownership choice (Franko
1971; Stopford and Wells 1972; Gatignon and Anderson 1988; Gomes-Casseres
1989; Hennart 1991a).
The correlation matrix of the independent variables suggests little
collinearity . Almost all correlations are low, the highest correlation
coefficient being the one between FOLLOW and GROWTHDEV (0.30).
4. Results
The results of the binomial logistic regression are presented in Tables 3
to 6. A positive coefficient means that the independent variable tends to
increase the probability that acquisition will be chosen: a negative
coefficient signifies the opposite.
Equation 1 in Table 3 reports the results for the full sample. The
model, which converged after seven iterations, has a high overall explanatory
power, with a chi-square of 55.68 (p=0.0000). One can also measure how well a
maximum likelihood model fits the data by using it to classify observations
(Amemiya 1981). The classification rate thus obtained can be compared to the
rate that would have been obtained by chance. That rate is equal to a2 + (1 -
a) , where a is the proportion of greenfield investment in the sample (Morison
1974). In our case, that base line rate is 51%. Table 4 shows that 71.1% of
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the observations are correctly classified, a rate higher than that which would
be expected by chance. The model's sensitivity rate, which describes its
ability to correctly predict positives (acquisitions) leaves room for
improvement, but its specificity, its capacity to correctly classify
greenfields, is excellent.
All significant variables have the predicted signs, except FOLLOW and
PSALG. The coefficient of the Japanese parent's ratio of R&D expenditures to
sales (RND), is negative and significant at 0.01 level, as predicted by HI.
This confirms the view that R&D-intensive Japanese investors find greenfield
investment a more effective way to transfer their advantages to the U.S., as
greenfield entry makes it possible to "mold" a virgin management and labor
force into the parent's culture. Our result is also consistent with Gittelman
and Dunning 's (1991) argument that Japanese investors who do not have clear
competitive advantages over their U.S. rivals have acquired U.S. firms to
strengthen their position.
As predicted by H3, but contrary to the predictions of merger theory
(Hll), Japanese parents are more likely to enter through acquisition if they
intend to manufacture in the U.S. a different product than those they produce
at home: the coefficient of COMMON is negative and significant at the 0.01
level. Parents who diversify need tacit industry knowledge and access to
distribution, which they can most efficiently obtain through acquisition.
Although they measured diversification in slightly different ways, Wilson
(1980), Yip (1982), Caves and Mehra (1986), and Zejan (1990) all found that




GROWTHDEV, the coefficient of the absolute value of the deviation from
the mean in the growth of shipment of the target U.S. industry, is positive
and significant (at 0.01). As hypothesized, acquisitions are favored when the
target industry experiences either very high or very low growth rates. Caves
and Mehra's (1986) found this to be also true in their study of foreign
investors in the U.S.
The coefficient of the variable describing the Japanese parent's
endowment of human resources (PSALG) , is significant (at the 0.05 level), but
with the wrong sign. We hypothesized earlier that when employment grows
faster than sales, the investor is likely to have excess personnel, and hence
no need to obtain managers through an acquisition. Because of lifetime
employment practices, however, large Japanese firms do not have the option of
firing redundant workers, but are expected to reassign them to new tasks. As
Roehl (1989) notes, many Japanese firms with excess workers have sought to
obtain quickly the complementary resources necessary to develop new
activities, and have used U.S. acquisitions to that end. Kubota's and Nippon
Kokan's acquisitions of high technology American companies fit this scenario
(Roehl 1989). Hence the positive correlation in our case between excess human
resources and acquisitions.
The coefficient of the relative size variable, RELSZ, has the correct sign
and is significant at 0.01 level. The larger the size of the U.S. operation,
the more likely that entry will be through acquisition. Caves and Mehra
(1986), who also found this variable significant, argue that when the size of
the investment is large relative to that of the parent, greenfield expansion
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is limited by the parent's stock of managerial resources. Because the
acquired firm comes with its own management, an acquisition makes it possible
to loosen these constraints on growth.
The coefficient of our dummy variable for being a 'follower* (FOLLOW) is
significant at 0.05, but negative, suggesting that, contrary to the
predictions of Knickerbocker (1973) and Dubin (1976), followers in industries
characterized by loose oligopoly tend to enter through greenfield investment.
Equations 2 and 3 in Table 3 suggest, however, that the statistical
significance of FOLLOW is due to its collinearity with GROWTHDEV. When
GROWTHDEV is excluded from the model (equation 3), FOLLOW becomes
insignificant, while the coefficient of GROWTHDEV remains significant when
FOLLOW is excluded (equation 2). While followers may choose acquisitions to
speed their entry, Caves and Mehra (1986) point out that their perceived
riskiness of greenfield entry is reduced because they benefit from the
experience of leaders. The two effects may cancel out.
The coefficients of the U.S. experience of the Japanese investor (EXP),
its advertising intensity (ADV) , its diversification ratio (DIV), the relative
cheapness of U.S. stocks (RVI), the Japanese firm's leverage ratio (LEV), the
concentration ratio of the target U.S. industry (CON), and the subsidiary's
joint venture status (JV), are all insignificant.
The lack of significance of our measure of experience EXP is consistent
with the results of recent studies: Kogut and Singh (1988) found that the
number of previous entries by foreign investors in the U.S. had no influence
on the entry mode. Similarly, international experience had no bearing on the
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entry strategies of Swedish MNEs in Zejan's (1990) sample. One possible
reason for the lack of significance of experience may be the offsetting impact
noted earlier: experienced Japanese investors have less need for acquisitions,
but they may feel more comfortable with making them. We explore this further
below.
Our finding that advertising intensity (ADV) has no impact on entry may
be due to the fact that three fourths of the Japanese entries in our sample
are in producer goods industries. Recall that H5 hinges on two crucial
assumptions: that established brands are an important asset, and that they
cannot be transferred from Japan. While this may be true in consumer goods
industries, in producer goods industries brand names are probably less crucial
to commercial success, but they are more transferable. Hence we might expect
advertising intensive Japanese manufacturers of producer goods to choose
greenfield entry, while those in consumer goods industries would choose
acquisitions. Pooling entries in producer goods and in consumer goods
industries may thus obscure the relationship between advertising intensity and
entry mode. We test this hypothesis later in this section.
The insignificant coefficient for the degree of diversification of the
Japanese investor (DIV) suggests that a diversified Japanese investor does not
have a greater tendency to enter through acquisitions than a less diversified
one if it is entering the U.S. to manufacture the same products it
manufactures in Japan. In other words, the impact of diversification on entry
mode occurs at the business, but not at the corporate level.
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Neither of the two financial variables, the relative value index RVI nor
the parent's leverage ratio LEV, are significant. 9 The lack of significance of
the relative value index is not surprising. To establish a link between the
fall of the dollar and the strength of the Japanese stock market on one hand,
and the wave of Japanese acquisitions in the U.S. on the other, one must show
that these factors caused the price of U.S. assets in the market for corporate
control to fall below the cost of adding new capacity through greenfield
investment. Efficient capital markets should (and apparently do) eliminate
such bargains for foreign, as well as for domestic investors.
The insignificant coefficient for the Japanese investor's leverage ratio
(LEV) probably reflects the idiosyncratic features of Japanese capital
markets. Relationships between Japanese banks and corporate borrowers are
more intimate and long-term than in the United States, and are often cemented
through mutual ownership stakes (Imai and Itami 1984). Hence, while in the
American case highly-leveraged firms may have difficulty borrowing to finance
greenfield investment, and may then opt for acquisitions, this is probably not
true in Japan because of the closer relationships and the greater volume of
information interchange between bankers and borrowers. Taken together, the
non-significance of these two variables suggests that strategic variables have
a stronger impact on the mode of entry than financial ones. Caves and Mehra
(1986) reached similar conclusions from their study of entries by foreign
investors in the U.S.
The coefficient of the concentration ratio of the target U.S. industry
(CON) is just short of significance at the 0.1 level (two tailed test). This
variable was also insignificant in Yip's (1982) study. As argued earlier, the
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impact of this variable may be obscured by the fact that, while acquisitions
may be more desirable in concentrated industries, they may run afoul of
antitrust law. 10 We probe this point further below.
As predicted, the ownership level of the affiliate (JV) has no
significant impact on the entry mode. This supports the view that the choice
between greenfield entry and acquisition is conceptually separate from the
degree of control that a parent seeks for its subsidiary.
Equation 4 in Table 3 investigates further the impact of target industry
characteristics. We expect the concentration ratio of the target industry to
interact with its rate of growth: when demand is growing rapidly, the
capacity-increasing features of greenfield entry are less of a problem in
concentrated industries. We therefore create a new variable, GROWCON, to
describe the combined impact of concentration and growth rate in the target
industry. GROWCON takes the value of the concentration ratio when demand
growth in the target industry is negative, and zero otherwise. As expected,
the coefficient of GROWCON is positive and significant (at the 0.05 level),
indicating that a high concentration ratio leads to acquisition when not
offset by demand growth. The coefficient of the target industry growth rate
is also positive and significant (at 0.05), suggesting that high growth leads
to acquisitions, while that of the concentration ratio is weakly negative
(significant at 0.1), implying a tendency by Japanese investors to avoid
acquisitions in concentrated industries. The coefficients of all the other
variables are basically unchanged. All in all, these results indicate the
importance of dynamic considerations in the choice of the mode of entry.
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To explore further the impact of the growth rate of the target U.S.
industry on Japanese entry strategies, we split the sample into two types of
industries. We rank industries according to their rate of growth of shipments
for the five years preceding entry. Equation 6 in Table 5 reports the results
for entries in industries in the lowest and highest quart iles, while equation
7 reports the coefficients for entries in the two middle quart iles. We would
expect transaction cost variables to exert a particularly strong influence in
industries with average growth, while in fast and slow growing industries the
impact of transaction cost variables would be mitigated by other strategic
considerations, such as the need for speedy entry and the impact of entry on
industry capacity. As expected, the tendency of R&D-intensive investors to
choose greenfield entry is weaker in exceptionally fast and slow growing
industries (equation 6). Note that in those industries, acquisitions tend to
be partial ones (the coefficient of the joint venture dummy JV is positive and
significant at the 0.05 level), suggesting that a partial acquisition is the
mode of entry that is least threatening to incumbents in slow growing
industries. Transaction cost variables (the investor's R and D intensity and
its need for industry-specific knowledge when diversifying), as well as the
attractiveness of acquisitions for companies making large investments, take
center stage in industries with average rate of growth (equation 7).
Earlier we have argued that one possible reason for the non-significance
of our advertising intensity variable may be the fact that our sample pools
entries into both consumer and producer goods U.S. industries. We test this
hypothesis by focusing, in equation 5 of Table 5, at entries in producer goods
industries. 11 As expected, advertising-intensive firms in those industries
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tend to enter through greenfield (the coefficient of ADV is negative and
significant at the 0.1 level). The coefficients of the other variables are
unchanged, except that the concentration ratio of the target U.S. industry
becomes significant (at the 0.1 level, two tailed) and that the
diversification ratio of the parent now exerts a significant (at 0.05) and
positive impact on acquisitions.
To investigate further the impact of experience on the choice of method
of entry, we split the sample between first entries and subsequent entries.
In Table 6, equation 8 shows the results for second and subsequent entries.
Except for the coefficients of our "follower" dummy (FOLLOW), which now
becomes insignificant, and that of the deviation from the target industry
demand growth (GROWTHDEV) , which is now only significant at 0.05, the
coefficients are similar to those of the full sample (equation 1), suggesting
that the experience gained from first entries does not affect the subsequent
entry choices of Japanese investors. Equation 9 reports the results for first
entries. Most coefficients are insignificant. This may be due to the small
sample size, to a greater number of 'wrong' entry choices by first-time
investors, or to omitted variables.
5 . Conclusions
This paper offers the first large sample empirical study of the factors
which influence the choice of Japanese firms between acquiring a U.S. firm or
establishing a greenfield subsidiary. It studies for the first time the mode
of entry used by firms of a single home country into a single host country,
thus keeping variations within home and host countries constant. We use
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direct measures of parent strategies, such as excess human resources and R&D
and advertising intensity, a significant improvement over most previous
studies which have used data on the characteristics of the U.S. industries
entered as proxies for these parent strategies.
The results from the full sample and from subsamples are robust, and they
tell a consistent story. They suggest that the mode of entry chosen by
Japanese investors is driven both by firm strategies and target markets
characteristics. Japanese MNEs favor greenfield entry when the scale of the
U.S. operation is relatively small. They also choose greenfields when they
intend to manufacture in the United States a product they already manufacture
at home. The more research intensive among Japanese MNEs enter the U.S.
through greenfield investments, presumably because it is the most efficient
way to transfer their technological advantages to U.S. shores.
In industries characterized by very high or very low growth, the
influence of some of these variables is tempered by two other factors which
favor acquisitions: acquisitions allow quicker entry, and they do not add to
capacity. Hence they are a good choice when demand grows rapidly, or for
entry into concentrated industries in which demand is growing slowly or is
decreasing.
We test for the impact of both strategic and financial variables. In
contrast to much conventional wisdom (Rohatyn 1989), we find that the low
value of the dollar and high Japanese stock prices have no statistically
significant impact on entry mode. We also consider the Japanese investors'
leverage ratios to ascertain whether long term liquidity influences their mode
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of entry. It does not, probably because of the particular characteristics of
Japanese financial markets.
We also offer the first direct test of the impact of oligopolistic
12
reaction on entry. In contrast to previous studies (Dubin 1976; Caves and
Mehra 1986), our test has the advantage of being performed at the level of the
firm and of controlling for all the other variables that may influence a
firm's entry mode. The results suggest that, everything else constant,




1. In closely related research, Amit, Livnat and Zarowin (1989) and Chatterjee
(1990) consider the choice between direct entry and acquisition as alternative
methods of diversification. Two less directly related studies (Lament and
Anderson 1985; Simmonds 1990) investigate the impact of entry mode (greenfield
vs. acquisition) on the success of diversification moves. Because these four
studies only consider one type of firm growth, diversification, their result,
although generally similar, are not directly comparable to those of the
present study.
2. For example, the recent books by Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and
Auerbach (1988) on mergers and acquisitions do not directly consider mergers
and acquisitions as alternatives routes of firm growth.
3. These firm-specific advantages are a type of what Teece (1982) calls "slack
internal resources" or what Chatterjee (1990) calls "excess resources".
4. For some anecdotal evidence of management problems following Japanese
acquisitions of U.S. firms see Byrne (1986) and Economist (1991).
5. As shown by Graham and Krugman (1989), the fall of the dollar relative to
the yen does not per se lead to more Japanese investment. Nor does it per se
favor acquisitions over greenfield, since it lowers the cost of all U.S.
assets, whether acquired on the market for inputs or that for corporate
control. I am indebted to a referee for bringing this point to my attention.
6. Current merger guidelines stipulate that in markets with Herfindahl indexes
in excess of 1800 a merger that raises this index will not be permitted
without considerable scrutiny (Oster, 1990., p. 198).
7. Kogut and Singh (1988) found that acquisitions accounted for more than half
of the 506 cases of foreign investment in the U.S. over the 1981-1985 period.
The percentage for U.K. investors was 78 percent.
8. Note that our unit of analysis is the couple of parent-affiliate. Our
sample may thus include more than one parent for a given affiliate.
9. Chatterjee (1990) found that a firm's leverage increased the probability it
would choose acquisitions, but she only considered diversification modes and
did not control for firm strategies.
10. Substituting the target sector's minimum efficient scale for its
concentration ratio did not change the results.
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11. Industries were classified as producer goods industries if the percentage
of their output going directly into consumption and/or wholesale trade was
lower or equal to the U.S. average. I am indebted to Thomas Kohn for this data
which is calculated from U.S. input-output tables (see Kohn 1988).
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TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIONS OP SAMPLE POPULATION
1.1 Product Categories of Subsidiaries
SIC Industries Population % Sample % Diff (%)
20 Food & Kindred Products 67 10.15 21 6.29 -3.86
22 Textiles Mill Products 5 0.76 1 0.30 -0.46
23 Apparel & Other Textile Products 18 2.73 3 0.90 -1.83
24 Lumber & Wood Products 8 1.21 1 0.30 -0.91
25 Furniture & Fixtures 4 0.61 0.00 -0.61
26 Paper & Allied Products 11 1.67 5 1.50 -0.17
27 Printing & Publishing 6 0.91 2 0.60 -0.31
28 Chemicals & Allied Products 60 9.09 35 10.48 1.39
29 Petroleum & Coal Products 2 0.30 0.00 -0.30
30 Rubber & Misc. Plastic Products 49 7.42 15 4.49 -2.93
32 Stone, Clay, & Glass Products 15 2.27 12 3.59 1.32
33 Primary Metal Products 44 6.67 22 6.59 -0.08
34 Fabricated Metal Products 54 8.18 15 4.49 -3.69
35 Industrial Machinery & Equipment 107 16.21 67 20.06 3.85
36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 120 18.18 93 27.84 9.66
37 Transportation Equipment 31 4.70 17 5.09 0.39
38 Instruments & Related Products 43 6.52 19 5.69 -0.83
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 16 2.42 6 1.80 -0.63
Total 660 100.00 334 100.00
1.2 Comparison of Frequencies of Acquisition & Greenfield Investment
Year 1978 1979 1980 1984 1985 1986 1987 Total (%;
Population
Acquisition 9 12 13 24 29 46 70 203(36,,38%)
Greenfield 14 34 22 33 57 69 126 355(63,.62%)
Total 23 46 35 57 86 115 196 558(100%)
Sample
Acquisition 7 4 7 12 19 28 37 114(42..22%)
Greenfield 3 15 5 19 27 37 50 156(57.,78%)







SUMMARY OF VARIABLES AND EXPECTED SIGNS
(+ = encourage acquisition)
Variable Name Description Theories and Expected Signs
TC AC GF CI
RND R&D/sales of parent
EXP U.S. experience of parent
COMMON similarity of products between
parent and subsidiary
DIV parent diversification ratio
ADV adv/sales of parent
RVI relative value index
GROWTHDEV growth of shipments







followers in oligopolistic range
concentration ratio
of U.S. industry entered
parent ' s excess supply of managers
relative size
subsidiary/parent
leverage ratio of parent
TC = Transaction cost theory
AC = Merger and acquisition theory
GF = Theory of the growth of the firm
CI = Capital market imperfection theory
38
TABLE 3
RESULTS OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION: ACQUISITION VS. GREENFIELD INVESTMENT
(acquisition*!)
Variable Name Description Standardized Coefficients (t-statistic)
1 2 3
Intercept
RND R&D/sales of parent
EXP U.S. experience of parent
ADV adv/ sales of parent
COMMON sameness of products between
parent and subsidiary
DIV diversification ratio of parent
RVI relative value index
GROWTHDEV growth of shipments
of U.S. industry entered
deviates from average
FOLLOW followers in oligopolistic range
CON concentration ratio
of U.S. industry entered
PSALG parent's endowment of
human resources
RELSZ relative size
subs i di ary/parent
LEV leverage ratio of parent
JV type of ownership
GROWTH growth of shipments
of U.S. industry entered





proportion of correct classifications
0.1963 -0.1921 -0.1999 -0.1992
(1.27) (1.25) (1.32) (1.29)
0.4577 -0.4489 -0.4226 -0.4817
(2.72)a (2.65)a (2.52)a (2.82)a
0.1930 -0.1708 -0.1419 -0.1879
(1.25) (1.13) (0.94) (1.21)
0.1979 0.2321 0.1998 0.1919
(1.06) (1.24) (1.12) (1.10)
0.4271 -0.4445 -0.4650 -0.4321
(2.84)a (2.96)8 (3.14)a (2.84)a
0.0840 0.0819 0.1067 0.1002
(0.55) (0.54) (0.71) (0.65)
0.1119 0.0990 0.1006 0.1060





0.2314 -0.2412 -0.2175 -0.3023
(1.58) (1.63) (1.51) (1.94)c
0.2790 0.2951 0.2711 0.2860
(1.58)c (1.68)b (1.62)c (1.65)b
1.5849 1.5822 1.5290 1.5993
(4.43)a (4.44)a (4.40)a (4.46)a
0.1702 0.2154 0.1796 0.1778
(1.14) (1.46)c (1.20) (1.18)
0.1613 0.1877 0.1555 0.1465





55.68 53.80 50.91 55.60
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
270 270 270 270
71.1 69.6 69.6 71.5
a p<0.01 b p<0.05 c p<0. 1 (one tailed) (double subscripts=two tailed)
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TABLE 4
CLASSIFICATION TABLE FOR EQUATION 1
PREDICTED
GREENFIELD ACQUISITION TOTAL
GREENFIELD 129 27 156
TRUE
ACQUISITION 51 63 114






RESULTS OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION: ACQUISITION VS. GREENFIELD INVESTMENT
(acquisition^)

















U.S. experience of parent
adv/ sales of parent
sameness of products between
parent and subsidiary
diversification ratio of parent
relative value index
growth of shipments
of U.S. industry entered
deviates from average
followers in oligopolistic range
concentration ratio











































a p<0.01 b p<0.05 c p<0.1 (one tailed) (double subscripts=two tailed)
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TABLE 6
RESULTS OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION: ACQUISITION VS. GREENFIELD INVESTMENT
(acquisition*!)
Variable Name Description Standardized Coefficients
(t-statistic)
Intercept
RNO R&D/sales of parent
ADV adv/sales of parent
COMMON sameness of products between
parent and subsidiary
OIV diversification ratio of parent
RVI relative value index
GROWTHDEV growth of shipments
of U.S. industry entered
deviates from average
FOLLOW followers in oligopolistic range
CON concentration ratio
of U.S. industry entered




LEV leverage ratio of parent



































a p<0.01 b p<0.05 c p<0.1 (one tailed) (double subscripts=two tailed)
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